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ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW

EPTL § 9-1.1: New York Court of Appeals excludes preemptive
and exclusive consignment rights in commercial settings from the
Rule against Perpetuities
New York's Rule against Perpetuities (the "Rule"), a common-law principle codified in EPTL section 9-1.1, prohibits remote
vesting of interests in property by limiting the time period in
which future interests may vest." The Rule voids all contingent interests in property that do not vest within the time period specified; 2 its inflexibility can therefore operate to invalidate otherwise
legitimate transactions.3 In order to avoid its harshness, courts
have created a number of qualified exceptions to the Rule.4 New
I See EPTL § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1992). Section 9-1.1(a)(2) provides that "[e]very present or future estate shall be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute power of
alienation by any limitation or condition for a longer period than lives in being at the creation of the estate and a term of not more than twenty-one years." Id. § 9-1.1(a)(2). Section
9-1.1(b) further provides that "[n]o estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the
estate and any period of gestation involved." Id. § 9-1.1(b).
The common-law Rule was judicially created in seventeenth century England to restrict
the ability of royalty and landed gentry to control indefinitely the disposition of their property. See, e.g., Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (High Ct. Ch. 1681). The Rule
evolved to prevent property from being restricted by future interests so remote that its free
alienability and marketability would be impaired, thus preventing its full utilization for the
benefit of society and the current owners. See Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condominium, 119
A.D.2d 73, 76, 505 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (1st Dep't 1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 743, 504
N.E.2d 700, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1987).
John Chipman Gray summarized the Rule best in a single sentence when he stated that
"[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest." JOHN C. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PSmETUITMS § 201 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942). This formulation is considered by the courts
to be the classic statement of the Rule. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1720-21 (1983).
The common-law Rule has been applied uniformly throughout the United States, except where modified by statute. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 638, 639 (1938). Similar to most states which have codified the Rule, New York's
Rule is substantially an application of common-law principles. Id. at 639.
2 See EPTL § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1992).
S See Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 165, 492
N.E.2d 379, 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306, 311 (1986) (creating exception to New York Rule for
preemptive rights in commercial and governmental transactions).
4 See Wong v. DiGrazia, 386 P.2d 817, 825 n.19 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). In Wong, the
court noted several exceptions to the Rule, such as gifts to charity, rights of entry, possibilities of reverter, resulting trusts, and covenants running with the land. Id.
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York recognizes a limited exception to the Rule for preemptive
rights in connection with commercial and governmental property
transactions.5 Recently, in Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis,6 the New
York Court of Appeals extended this exception when it held that
preemptive and exclusive consignment rights that serve significant
commercial interests are not subject to the Rule.7
The critical facts of Wildenstein are as follows. Without Wallis's knowledge, his wife gave two paintings from his collection to
certain individuals in exchange for her receiving a loan of approximately one million dollars.8 The lenders then sold the paintings to
Wildenstein.9 Upon discovering these events, Wallis sued to recover the paintings, but the controversy ultimately resulted in a
settlement agreement ("the agreement").10 Under the agreement,
Wildenstein was required to return the two paintings to Wallis in
An exception to the Rule was first granted to preemptive rights in Weber v. Texas Co.,
83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936). In Weber, a lessee attempted to
exercise his preemptive right to purchase the lessor's royalty interests in an oil and gas
lease. Weber, 83 F.2d at 807. The lessor refused to honor the lessee's preemptive right and
argued that it violated the Rule. Id. at 808. In deciding to exempt the preemptive right from
the Rule, the court looked to the policy reasons behind the Rule in the following analysis:
The rule against perpetuities springs from considerations of public policy.
The underlying reason for and purpose of the rule is to avoid fettering real property with future interests dependent upon contingencies unduly remote which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and development for long periods
of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation, which is regarded at
common law as a public evil.
The option under consideration is within neither the purpose of nor the reason for the rule ....
The option is therefore not objectionable as a perpetuity.
Id. (citations omitted).
Several courts have adopted the reasoning set forth in Weber. See, e.g., Cambridge Co.
v. East Slope Inv. Corp., 700 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Shiver v. Benton, 304 S.E.2d
903, 906 (Ga. 1983); Bruken, 67 N.Y.2d at 166, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 311;
Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772, 776 (Okla. 1980); Robroy Land Co. v. Prather, 622
P.2d 367, 370 (Wash. 1980); Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1363 (Wyo. 1981).
Additionally, many states have attempted to reduce the Rule's harshness by adopting
remedial statutes. See Verner F. Chaffin, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to
Georgia Wills and Trusts: A Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 16 GA. L. REv. 235, 345
(1982). States adopt either the wait-and-see principle, where the interest is valid if it actually vests within the period of the rule, or the cy pres doctrine, where courts may modify a
limitation so as to carry out the intention of the transferor within the bounds of the rule. Id.
at 345-52.
Bruken, 67 N.Y.2d at 156, 492 N.E.2d at 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
6 79 N.Y.2d 641, 595 N.E.2d 828, 584 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1992).
Id. at 651, 595 N.E.2d at 834, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
Id. at 645, 595 N.E.2d at 830, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
SId.
10 Id.
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exchange for preemptive rights to purchase and exclusive consignment to auction fifteen other valuable paintings in Wallis's collection.1 1 The suit was initiated in federal district court after Wallis's
successors failed to honor the agreement. 12 The defendants inyoked the Rule and the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property.1 3 The district court dismissed
the complaint, and Wildenstein appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 4 which certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was
requested to determine if either the New York statutory Rule or
the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation
of property applied to invalidate Wildenstein's preemptive and
consignment rights. 5
11Id. at 644, 595 N.E.2d at 829, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 754. Without his knowledge, Wallis's
wife gave a number of paintings from his collection to a group of confidence men as collateral for a loan. Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 949 F.2d 632, 633 (2d Cir. 1991). The con-men
took two paintings to Wildenstein's office and sold them to him for $650,000. Id. Wallis
eventually learned that Wildenstein had acquired the paintings and informed him that the
paintings were sold without his permission and demanded their return. Id. at 634. Through
counsel, the two parties negotiated a settlement agreement for the return of the paintings.
Id. Under the terms of the agreement, Wildenstein was required to sell the paintings back
to Wallis for $665,000, which represented the original price plus expenses. Id. Additionally,
Wildenstein was given a right of first refusal and an exclusive right of consignment with
respect to all fifteen paintings in Wallis's collection. Id. The agreement provided that Wallis
was required to give Wildenstein at least thirty days notice prior to any proposed sale of a
painting in the collection and that Wildenstein would have the option to purchase the
painting on the same terms as the proposed sale. Id. at 635. It was also agreed that if Wallis
decided to sell any paintings at auction, they would first be consigned exclusively to Wildenstein for a six month period. Id. The rights of first refusal and exclusive consignment were
also binding upon Wallis's executors, successors, and assigns and could be asserted by Wldenstein's successors and assigns. Id. The agreement excluded any painting given to any
charitable organization formed pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). Id.
12 See Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 756 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Hal Wallis
died in October 1986. Id. Pursuant to the terms of the Hal B. Walhis Trust, most of the
paintings in the Wallis collection went to the Hal B. Wallis Foundation. Id. One painting
went to the decedents son, Brent Walls, subject to his guarantee not to sell the painting.
Id. Brent Wallis nonetheless sold his painting, and the Hal B. Wallis Foundation made
plans to sell the paintings it had in its possession. Id. Wildenstein then sued, naming Brent
Wallis, the Walls Trust, and the Wallis Foundation as defendants. Id.
"' Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 645, 595 N.E.2d at 830, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
14 Id.

Id. The Second Circuit decided that the New York Court of Appeals should decide
the issues because there were no New York cases directly on point and because of New
York's strong interest in having important questions of state law decided by New York
courts "rather than having [a] potentially erroneous federal appeals court [supply] precedent on point." Wildenstein & Co., 949 F.2d at 636.
The certified questions posed to the New York Court of Appeals were as follows:
(1) Does the New York Rule against Perpetuities apply to preemptive rights and
15
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Writing for the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Bellacosa
concluded that the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property did not apply because the agreement was reasonable in terms of price, duration, and purpose."6
Additionally, relying on Metropolitan TransportationAuthority v.
Bruken Realty Corp.," which created an exception to the Rule for
future consignment interests in personal property?
(2) Does the New York common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation invalidate preemptive rights and future consignment interests in personal
property?
(3) If either the Rule Against Perpetuities or the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation invalidates the preemptive rights and future consignment interests at issue here, can the beneficiary of those rights and interests
assert a claim for unjust enrichment stemming from the loss of such rights and
interests?
(4) If either the Rule Against Perpetuities or the common law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation invalidates the preemptive rights and future consignment interests at issue here, can the beneficiary of those rights and interests
nevertheless state a claim for fraudulent inducement and fraud arising from the
transaction that gave it such rights and interests?
Id.
Because the first two questions were ultimately answered in the negative, it was unnecessary to answer the third and fourth questions. See Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 652-53, 595
N.E.2d at 835, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
'6 Id. at 652, 595 N.E.2d at 835, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 760. The court noted that the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation was designed to condemn
prohibitions against transferability of property. Id. at 651-52, 595 N.E.2d at 834, 584
N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 542, 141 N.E.2d 812,
818, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423 (1957)). The rights in question were tested under a reasonableness standard in view of their duration, price, and purpose. See Metropolitan Transp. Auth.
v. Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 167, 492 N.E.2d 379, 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306, 312
(1986). The Wildenstein court found that the thirty day period during which Wildenstein
could exercise his preemptive right and the six month period in which he could have exclusive consignment rights were of reasonable duration. Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 652, 595
N.E.2d at 834, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 759. Also, preemptive rights conditioned upon payment
equal to a third party offer were reasonable. Id. Finally, the parties' arm's length agreement
was considered to be a reasonable settlement of a commercial dispute. Id. at 652, 595 N.E.2d
at 835, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 760 ("It ill behooves a court to substitute its sense of unreasonableness for the parties' arm's length agreement in the circumstances of a settlement of an essentially commercial dispute like the one in this case.").
1767 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1986) (holding New York's Rule
not applicable to preemptive rights in commercial and governmental transactions). In
Bruken, the Delbay Corporation, a subsidiary of Pennsylvania Railroad, purchased air
rights over certain real property from the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in
1966. Id. at 160, 492 N.E.2d at 380, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 307. The air rights came with an option
to purchase the underlying property if the MTA subsequently determined that the property
was no longer needed for railroad operations. Id. In 1982, the MTA notified Delbay that it
no longer needed some of the property and that Delbay could purchase it. Id. Delbay then
assigned its right to purchase the property to Bruken Realty Corp. Id. When Bruken tried
to exercise the option, the MTA instituted an action to have the option declared void as
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preemptive rights in commercial and governmental real property
transactions, Judge Bellacosa concluded that Wildenstein's first refusal and consignment rights did not violate the New York Rule.' 8
Although a subsequent New York Court of Appeals decision, Morrison v. Piper,' stated that in general the Rule was applicable to a
right of first refusal in residential property, Judge Bellacosa concluded that the Morrison decision did not limit the scope of
Bruken when applied to contemporary commercial settings.20
In his concurring opinion, Judge Hancock stated that, although he agreed with the court's determination that the New
York Rule did not invalidate Wildenstein's preemptive and consignment rights, it was unnecessary to determine whether the
agreement should be excepted from the Rule because such an
agreement was not violative of the Rule.2 ' Noting that the Rule
violative of the New York Rule. Id. The court, in finding the option not in violation of the
Rule, noted:
[A]lthough preemptive rights unlimited in duration violate the rule against remote
vesting they do so only marginally and that application of the rule, because of its
inflexibility, may operate to invalidate legitimate transactions. This is so particularly in commercial and governmental activities because neither "lives in being"
nor "twenty one years" are periods which are relevant to business or governmental
affairs.
Id. at 165-66, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
" Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 650, 595 N.E.2d at 833, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
19 77 N.Y.2d 165, 566 N.E.2d 643, 565 N.Y.S.9d 444 (1990) (applying New York's Rule
to first refusal right to noncommercial property between private parties). In Morrison,
Maier conveyed a parcel of residential land to her nephew, Morrison, and retained a contiguous parcel. Id. at 168, 566 N.E.2d at 644, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 445. "The parcels were part of 38
acres of lakefront property ...which had been family owned since 1904." Id. The deed to
Morrison's parcel created mutual rights of first refusal in each party. Id. Two years later
Maier died, leaving her parcel to her sisters, two of whom sold the parcel without giving
Morrison the opportunity to exercise his preemptive right. Id. at 169, 566 N.E.2d at 645, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 446. In a suit by Morrison to enforce his preemptive right, the court, on appeal,
was faced with two issues: (1) whether New York's rule against remote vesting applied to
the type of right present in the case; and (2) whether the specific provision found in the
deed violated the rule. Id. at 167-68, 566 N.E.2d at 644, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 445. The Morrison
court declined to exclude preemptive rights in noncommercial transactions from the rule for
two reasons. Id. at 171, 566 N.E.2d at 646, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 447. First, the transaction did
not affect governmental interests, and second, unlike in Bruken, the time limits on vesting
in EPTL § 9-1.1(b)--"twenty-one years" and "lives in being"-were relevant. Id. The court,
however, concluded that the specific provision in the deed did not violate the rule. Id.
20 Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 650, 595 N.E.2d at 833, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758. "The parties'
agreement, although factually in the borderland between the transactions considered in
Bruken and Morrison, is plainly closer to that in Bruken and qualifies for the commercial
escape route from the rule expounded as part of Bruken's rationale." Id. at 650-51, 595
N.E.2d at 833-34, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
21Id. at 653, 595 N.E.2d at 835, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Hancock, J., concurring).
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contains rules of construction which require a presumption that

the drafter of the agreement intended it to be valid,22 Judge Hancock concluded that the fact that the agreement was binding on
the Wallises' executors, successors, and assigns, but not their heirs,
suggested they did not intend to bind future generations.2 3 Accordingly, Judge Hancock concluded that this statutory presumption
saved the agreement from invalidity.24
It is submitted that the Wildenstein court correctly excepted
the agreement from the New York Rule. In prior decisions, the
court had stated that options to purchase property and preemptive
rights were covered by the rule; 25 however, the Wildenstein agreement "qualifie[d] for the commercial escape route from the rule
expounded as part of Bruken's rationale. ' 2 6 The Court of Appeals

stated that although the Wildenstein agreement fell factually between Bruken and Morrison, it was closer to Bruken.2 The court
found no reason to treat future consignment rights differently from
preemptive rights in commercial settings,2 s which are not subject
to the rule against remote vesting when application of the rule
would defeat its underlying policies. 29 Such policy considerations
22 Id.; see EPTL § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 1992) ("It shall be presumed that the creator
intended the estate to be valid.").
23 Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 653, 595 N.E.2d at 835, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Hancock, J.,

concurring).
24

Id.

See Morrison v. Piper, 77 N.Y.2d 165, 169, 566 N.E.2d 643, 645, 565 N.Y.S.2d 444,
446 (1990) (refusing to exempt preemptive rights in land transactions between private parties from Rule).
Options differ from preemptive rights in that:
An option creates in the optionee a power to compel the owner of property to sell
it at a stipulated price whether or not he be willing to part with ownership. A preemption does not give to the pre-emptioner the power to compel an unwilling
owner to sell; it merely requires the owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer
the property first to the person entitled to the pre-emption, at the stipulated
price.
6 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET. AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952).
2 Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 651, 595 N.E.2d at 834, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 759. In Bruken,
the New York Court of Appeals left open the question of whether a preemptive right not
granted within the governmental or commercial context runs afoul of the Rule. 9B PATRICK
J. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE T 9-1.1[12][b], at 9-186 (1992).
" Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 595 N.E.2d at 833-34, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
28 Id. at 649, 595 N.E.2d at 832, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 757. Because preemptive rights and
future assignment interests both constitute future contingent interests in property which
can only be triggered by the party's decision to sell, the court saw "no distinction to justify
treating [future consignment] rights differently from preemptive rights." Id.
2 See Bruken, 67 N.Y.2d at 165, 492 N.E.2d at 383, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The policies
25
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are similarly used in other jurisdictions where the Rule is enforced
only when the purposes of the Rule are served.30 The purpose of
the Rule was properly served in the noncommercial family transaction in Morrison, but this decision should not be read to limit the
application of exceptions to the Rule in "contemporary commercial
settings." 1
Although not explicitly stated, there were two factors that
may have swayed the Wildenstein court to rule as it did. First, the
agreement was at "arm's length" between two sophisticated parties.3 2 Second, there was no specific intent on the part of the testator to control future generations' use of the property.3 3 The court
reasoned that upholding Wildenstein's preemptive and consignment rights furthered the significant commercial interests of "facilitating broader marketing of world-renowned art treasures"34 while
underlying the Rule would be defeated when application of the Rule would invalidate an
agreement which promoted the use and development of property while imposing only a minor limitation on the alienability of property. Id. at 166, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at
311. The Wildenstein court employed the same rationale when it noted that preemptive
rights "serve significant commercial interests by facilitating broader marketing of worldrenowned art treasures while posing, at the most, only a minimal limitation on the alienability of the works." Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 651, 595 N.E.2d at 834, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
20 See, e.g., Cambridge Co. v. East Slope Inv. Corp., 700 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)
(holding right of preemption contained in condominium declaration did not violate Rule). In
Cambridge, the preemption right was binding on condominium unit owners and "'their
grantees, successors, heirs, executors, administrators, divisees or assigns.'" Id. at 539. The
court noted that a technical application of the Rule would void such an agreement, but
refused to apply the Rule mechanically when the preemptive right posed no threat to free
alienability. Id. at 542; see also Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 518 P.2d 493 (Kan. 1974) (holding
commercial leases did not violate Rule). The Kansas Supreme Court elected to follow the
"modern tendency . . . to temper the rule if possible where its harsh application would
obstruct or do violence to an intended scheme of property disposition." Id. at 494. This
decision is analogous to Bruken and Wildenstein in that an exception was created because
"[tihe rule against perpetuities generally bears little relation to contemporary business practices or to the everyday world of commercial affairs." Id.
" Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 650, 595 N.E.2d at 833, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (emphasis
added).
2 Id. at 646-47, 595 N.E.2d at 830-31, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56. It was only after lengthy
settlement negotiations that the agreement was signed. Id. Wildenstein was a commercial
art dealer and Wallis was an avid art collector. Id. at 647, 595 N.E.2d at 831, 584 N.Y.S.2d
at 756.
33 Id. at 651, 595 N.E.2d at 834, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 759. "The agreement le[ft] the Wallises, and their executors, successors and assigns, free to maintain the paintings in the private collection or transfer them to a tax-exempt charitable organization. . . ." Id. Wildenstein's right only originated if the Walises chose to sell the paintings. Id. Under the
agreement, "Wildenstein [had to] ... meet a third party's offer if it elect[ed] to exercise its
preemptive right... ." Id. Thus, the Wallises would realize the highest possible price if they
decided to sell. Id.
34

Id.
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posing only minimal effects on alienability. This policy clearly outweighs the purpose underlying the rule against remote vesting."5
Additionally, even though the time limits for vesting, namely
"twenty-one years" and "lives in being" 6 are relevant, the "commercial and precedential context" of the agreement qualified it for
the Bruken exception to the Rule. 37 Exceptions to the rigid Rule
are permitted because EPTL section 9-1.1 grants the court authority to avoid invalidation of a transfer when the court deems it necessary. 8 Justified exceptions are the only way to mitigate the adverse effects of the Rule since the New York statutory scheme does
not adopt other traditional remedies such as the wait-and-see approach or the cy pres doctrine.3 9 Ultimately, Wildenstein has expanded the list of qualified exceptions to the Rule. The practitioner, however, is faced with the difficult task of determining what
may or may not fit under this new exception. Even so, this policy
of weighing the underlying purpose of the Rule with the actual effect on alienability of property should continue to be applied

3 Id. at 650, 595 N.E.2d at 833, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758. A case such as this presents a
balancing test question. See 9B ROHAN, supra note 26, 9-1.1[12][a], at 9-174. The question
is whether the option "serve[s] business ends sufficiently to outweigh the social policy implemented by the rule against perpetuities." Id.
36 See EPTL § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1992).
Wildenstein, 79 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 595 N.E.2d at 833-34, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
38 Id. (citing Morrison v. Piper, 77 N.Y.2d 165, 171-74, 566 N.E.2d 643, 646-48, 565
N.Y.S.2d 444, 447-49 (1990)). The Morrison court read EPTL § 9-1.3(b) to allow exceptions
to the Rule if possible and when necessary to avoid constructions which frustrate the intended purpose of an agreement. Morrison, 77 N.Y.2d at 173, 566 N.E.2d at 648, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 449.
" See Chaffin, supra note 4, at 345-52. The wait-and-see approach and cy pres doctrine
have been legislated in several states as remedial devices to reform the Rule. Id. at 345.
Under the wait-and-see approach, a court is permitted "to consider the actual sequence of
events occurring after the creation of the interest." Id. Therefore, if the interest actually
vests within the period of the Rule, there is no violation, and the interest is not voided. Id.
Wait-and-see legislation can be either limited wait-and-see, where the validity of the interest is determined by the events existing at the end of any preceding life estates, or unlimited
wait-and-see, where all future interests are based on facts as they actually occur. Id. at 346;
see, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 97 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1953) (judicially adopting waitand-see approach).
Under the cy pres doctrine, the judicial power to reform is given in order to "mitigate
the destructive impact of the Rule against Perpetuities." Chaffin, supra note 4, at 350. Statutes allowing cy pres either authorize full judicial power to reform or limited power such as
allowing reduction of age contingencies only. Id. at 350-51. Other statutes combine waitand-see with cy pres. Id. at 351; see, e.g., Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1962) (applying cy pres technique).

1993]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

463

to modern transactions which do not contradict the historical purpose of the Rule.
James P. Lundy

